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Inherent Limits to the World Trade 
Organization’s Article XXI Self-Judging 
Security Exception 
STUART DAVIS†  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States faces nine concurrent complaints1 in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) for its twenty-five percent tariff 
(i.e., import taxes) on foreign steel.2  While the WTO generally 
prohibits tariffs between its 164-members,3 the United States justified 
its protectionist measure under Article XXI of the WTO that exempts 
member states from tariff rules to protect “essential security 
interests.”4  Member states historically treated Article XXI as a last 
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1. China first requested consultations—the initial step in the WTO’s dispute resolution 
process—on April 4, 2018. See United States – Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum 
Products, Request for Consultations By China, WTO Doc. G/L/1222 (Apr. 4, 2018). The 
United States subsequently received eight more complaints from India, European Union, 
Canada, Mexico, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, and Turkey. See G/L/1222 (providing list of 
all related complaints against the United States’ steel tariff).  
 2.  The tariff proclamation allowed for individual countries to negotiate and remove the 
tariff. Proclamation No. 9705, 83 FR 11625 (May 24, 2018) (amended). 
 3.   The WTO membership accounts for 96.7% of the world’s total GDP and 96.4% of 
total international trade (i.e., exchange of goods and services) between countries. PETER 
JOHN WILLIAMS, A HANDBOOK ON ACCESSION TO THE WTO, 1, https://www.wto.org/english 
/thewto_e/acc_e/cbt_course_e/c1s1p1_e.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2018). 
 4.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat, A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter WTO Agreement] (The 1994 Marrakesh Agreement subsumed the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and created the modern WTO. For consistency and 
clarity, article citations hereinafter refer to the modern, complete WTO Agreement).   
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resort and rarely invoke the article to ensure no member state could 
abuse its language to skirt WTO rules.5  The complainants accuse the 
United States of pretextually using Article XXI to benefit its 
domestic steel industry.6 
The seemingly esoteric dispute over the WTO’s Article XXI 
national security exception presents an existential threat to the 
international trading system.  On the one hand, the United States 
argues that national security issues solely constitute “political matters 
not susceptible to review or capable of resolution by WTO dispute 
settlement.  Every member of the WTO retains the authority to 
determine for itself… its essential security interests.”7  In other 
words, any WTO member may interpret XXI’s margin of 
appreciation (i.e., discretion in applying a treaty’s terms) for 
themselves. 
On the other hand, the nine complainants assert the steel tariffs 
violate the rights of WTO members, the U.S.’ obligations under the 
WTO, and impair the core pillars of the international trading system.8  
They contend neither the United States nor any other WTO member 
possesses unlimited discretion in applying Article XXI when it 
conflicts with the rights of other members.  Unless the parties settle 
their dispute in the interim, the case will eventually appear before the 
WTO’s Appellate Body (AB).9  The AB must address the key issue in 
this case, and their answer will shape the course of international trade 
for decades: to what extent may a WTO member decide Article 
XXI’s margin of appreciation for itself?  The dispute also begs 
practical questions about the ability of the WTO to bind members to 




 5.  See infra Part I(A). 
 6.  WTO disputes usually include third party member states. The current dispute 
includes Brazil, Columbia, Egypt, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Malaysia, Mexico, Norway, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Venezuela, and Bolivia. Panel Report, United States - Certain Measures on Steel and 
Aluminum Products - Request for Consultations by the European Union, WTO Doc. 
G/L/1243 (June 6, 2018). 
 7.  United States – Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, 
Communication from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS548/13 (July 6, 2018).  
 8.  See United States – Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, Request for 
Consultations by the European Union, WTO Doc. WT/DS548/1 (June 6, 2018) (listing, 
among others, violation of Article I’s Most Favored Nation provision and Article II’s 
national treatment provision). 
 9.  See infra note 78. 
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the AB possesses that authority, how should it balance a sovereign’s 
claim of national security on one side and international free trade on 
the other?  
The WTO provides member states some margin of appreciation 
in complying with its rules,10 but it has never formally ruled on the 
scope of Article XXI.11  The WTO should settle the steel tariff 
dispute12 by rejecting the U.S.’ invocation of Article XXI because it 
contravenes the language, structure, and purpose of the WTO, it 
exceeds the reasonable legal boundaries of self-judging provisions 
under the WTO’s margin of appreciation, and impermissibly 
threatens the viability of the WTO system based on past WTO cases 
that placed limits on similar exception articles within the WTO 
Agreement.  
This article provides the AB an analytical template to both 
resolve the current steel dispute and address future invocations of 
Article XXI.  The analysis elucidates why the WTO should narrowly 
construe Article XXI to preserve the international trading system.13 
Part II presents historical and legal context to Article XXI.  First, it 
traces the development of the WTO, emphasizing the strained but 
limited inclusion of Article XXI.  Second, it describes the 
international law’s rules for treaty interpretation and the binding 
nature of the AB’s decisions.  Part III analyzes the scope of Article 
XXI through a textual and analogical analysis of the WTO 
Agreement’s object and purpose.  This section argues the WTO 
Agreement’s margin of appreciation should preclude any unbounded 
interpretation of Article XXI’s language.  It also analogizes the 
present steel tariff dispute with the factually and legally similar WTO 
Shrimp-Turtle14 case.  The legal reasoning behind Shrimp-Turtle 
illustrates why Article XXI’s application should be limited whenever 
it threatens the multilateral trading system.  Part IV concludes with a  
 
 
 10.  See infra Part III(A). 
 11.  See infra Part II(A).   
 12.  The WTO dispute settlement procedure seeks to avoid formal judgement between 
member states. The WTO’s Appellate Body only makes a substantive legal ruling if both 
parties are unsatisfied with the arbitration process. This paper’s legal analysis is not limited 
to the United States steel tariff but applicable to any Article XXI dispute formally submitted 
to the Appellate Body for resolution. See infra note 78. 
 13.  See G. John Ikenberry, The End of Liberal International Order, 94 INT’L AFF., 7 
(2018) (discussing the current and likely continuing threats to the multilateral, rule-based 
international order). 
 14.  Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/23 (Nov. 26, 2001) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle]. 
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summary of why reasonable limits should be placed on Article XXI’s 
application and how the U.S.’ steel tariffs impermissibly exceed 
those boundaries. 
II. BACKGROUND  
The present dispute centers on the meaning of Article XXI(b) of 
the WTO Agreement.  It states: 
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed…  (b) to 
prevent any contracting party from taking any action 
which it considers necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests… (ii) relating to traffic in 
arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such 
traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on 
directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a 
military establishment; (iii) taken in time of war or 
other emergency in international relations.15  
This section first traces the historical development and 
application of Article XXI.  It subsequently provides a legal overview 
of how the WTO’s AB should adjudicate the present dispute under 
international law of treaty interpretation. 
A. Historical Context 
In 1944, at the close of World War II, the leaders of the Allied 
powers gathered in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire to design a 
stable post-world international environment.16  These leaders sought 
to avoid the devastation of the previous decades with strong, 
multilateral international institutions.17  The initial negotiations 
eventually crystalized into the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (“GATT”) in 1948.18  The GATT operated not only as a 
comprehensive international trade agreement, but also as an 
international organization to administer the agreement.19  The WTO 
 
 15.  WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. 21. 
 16.  See JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 92 (2006) (noting that idea of trade institution was raised during 
Bretton Woods but not implemented). 
 17.  The United States championed the multilateral system following the war and lead 
the development of diplomatic, economic, and security frameworks centered around 
American long-term national interest. G. JOHN IKENBERRY, LIBERAL LEVIATHAN: THE 
ORIGINS, CRISIS, AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN WORLD ORDER, 2 (2011). 
 18.  MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 2 (2006). 
 19.  Richard Sutherland Whitt, The Politics of Procedure: An Examination of the GATT 
Dispute Settlement Panel and the Article XXI Defense in the Context of the U.S. Embargo of 
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eventually replaced the GATT in 1994, but maintained its founding 
articles and principles.20  Most importantly, the WTO retained the 
GATT’s principle of Most Favored Nation (“MFN”), which requires 
member states to extend any trade deal (i.e., reduced tariffs) made 
with one member state to all member states.21  This principle targeted 
the “beggar thy neighbor”22 protectionist trade policies endemic to the 
interwar period.23  The GATT addressed one of the largest market 
failures of international trade through collective rules, tariff 
obligations, and arbitration procedures. 
1. Article XXI Drafters Balanced State Sovereignty with Treaty 
Integrity 
The GATT’s binding rules sparked criticism from member states 
from its inception.24  Member states worried that the agreement could 
have a coercive effect on national sovereignty.25  In response, the 
drafters of the GATT negotiated several limited exceptions to the 
MFN principle.26  The drafters included Article XXI, the national 
security exception, to avoid the absurd result of penalizing a member 






Nicaragua, 19 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 603, 606 (1987). 
 20.  See JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 38-41 (1990) (detailing 
the circumstances for an updated international trade institution); see also Amelia Porges, The 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, in THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 63 (T.P. Stewart ed., 1996) (discussing the process leading to the WTO’s 
creation). 
 21.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. I, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194. 
 22.  Beggar thy neighbor or “tit-for-tat” characterizes the practice of one state placing 
taxes on imported goods to help a domestic industry, thus sparking a cycle of increasingly 
stringent reciprocal tariffs. XING LIJUAN, BEHIND THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM: 
LEGAL INDIGENIZATION AND THE WTO IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 51 (2014). 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  See John H. Jackson, Designing and Implementing Effective Dispute Settlement 
Procedures: WTO Dispute Settlement, Appraisal and Prospects, in THE WTO AS AN 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 161, 163 (Anne O. Krueger ed., 1998) (outlining a number 
of “birth defects” that clouded the GATT’s legal status); see also Senator Eugene Millikin on 
GATT, at the Hearings on Reciprocal Trade Agreements Expansion Act of 1951, before the 
Senate Committee on Finance, 82d Congress, 1st Sess. 92 (1951) (“Anyone who reads GATT 
is likely to have his sanity impaired”). 
 25.  JACKSON, supra note 16, at 95. 
 26.  See MATSUSHITA, supra note 18, at 4 (describing the GATT’s eight exceptions to 
basic rules). 
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with them.27  The drafters agreed its application should be limited, but 
disagreed on whether states themselves or the GATT’s adjudicating 
body should decide what is covered under Article XXI.28   
Article XXI’s language does not expressly declare its national 
security exception self-judging,29 though its text could plausibly 
convey such an interpretation.30  The drafters recognized that such an 
interpretation could create a nullifying loophole for the GATT.31  
John Leddy, the U.S. representative and co-author of Article XXI, 
agreed with his international colleagues.32  He stated that “there was a 
great danger of having too wide an exception… that would permit 
anything under the sun.”33  Leddy and his international colleagues 
wanted Article XXI’s language flexible enough to accommodate 
concerns about national security while limited enough to prevent 
commercial tariffs disguised as national security measures.34  
This balanced construction of Article XXI eventually prevailed, 
and the GATT retained the article’s seemingly self-judging 
language,35 while expressly limiting its application to war or 
international emergencies without enumerating specific definitions of 




 27.  Roger P. Alford, The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 
697, 702 (2011). 
 28.  WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX OF THE GATT: ART. XXI 
SECURITY EXCEPTIONS 603, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/gatt19 
94_art21_jur.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2018). 
 29.  “Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed… to prevent any contracting party 
from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests.” WTO Agreement, art. 21. In the current steel tariff dispute, the United States 
rested its argument on the plain text reading of the article alone. See infra text accompanying 
notes 144‒147. 
 30.  See KRZYSZTOF J. PELC, MAKING AND BENDING INTERNATIONAL RULES: THE DESIGN 
OF EXCEPTIONS AND ESCAPE CLAUSES IN TRADE LAW, 102 (2016) (noting Article XXI lacks 
any explicit mention of self-judging language). 
 31.  United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Preparatory Comm. of the U.N. Conference 
on Trade & Emp’t, Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission A, at 19, U.N. Doc. 
E/PC/T/A/PV/33 (1947) [hereinafter Preparatory Comm].  
 32.  Alford, supra note 27, at 698. 
 33.  Preparatory Comm., supra note 31, at 20. 
 34.  Id.  
 35.  See infra Part III(C). 
 36.  Article XXI provides a list of concrete exceptions to the agreement, including trade 
relating to fissionable materials and implements of war. Unfortunately, the third and final 
exception repeats the vague language from Article XXI’s opening clause, “[Nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent any contracting party from taking any action] taken 
in time of war or other emergency in international relations.”  WTO Agreement, art. 21. 
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the good faith compliance of member states would prevent future 
abuses, namely attempts to cloak commercial protectionist measures 
with alleged national security emergencies.37  
The United States overall negotiating strategy behind the GATT 
also supports a limited reading of Article XXI.  On the one hand, the 
American delegation pushed for self-judging national security 
language to preserve American sovereignty.38  The Cold War made 
national security a top priority, and American diplomats did not want 
to cede policy control to an international organization.39  On the other 
hand, the United States needed the multilateral, rule-based trading 
system to succeed to solidify American economic interests at home 
and abroad.40  The American delegation insisted on the GATT’s (and 
later the WTO’s) dispute resolution mechanism because they 
believed binding rules and formal arbitration would promote greater 
compliance with multilateral trade rules.41  Article XXI’s language 
reflects the delicate balance between these twin objectives: national 
security and trade compliance.   
2. The Marshall Plan Provided an Early Indication of Article 
XXI’s Limited Scope 
The United States first invoked Article XXI in a trade dispute 
with Czechoslovakia in 1949.42  The United States had recently 
launched the “Marshall Plan,” a sweeping post-war strategy to 
combat the spread of Communism in Europe.43  The Marshall Plan 




 37.  Alford, supra note 27, at 699. 
 38.  See Senate Finance Committee, Preliminary Summary of Geneva Draft of ITO 
Charter, Changes from New York Draft, WORLD TRADE LAW, 3 (Sep. 15, 1947), 
https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/05/more-gatt-article-xxi-negotiating-histo 
ry.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2018). 
 39.  Melvyn P. Leffler, The American Conception of National Security and the 
Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-1948, 89 AM. HIS. R. 346, 358 (1984). 
 40.  See ROBERT KAGAN, THE WORLD AMERICA MADE 40 (2013) (associating American 
twentieth century prosperity with the rule-based, international order it helped create). 
 41.  William R. Sprance, The World Trade Organization and United States’ 
Sovereignty: The Political and Procedural Realities of the System, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
1225, 1231 (1998). 
 42.  Contracting Parties Decision, Article XXI – United States Exports Restrictions (June 
8, 1949), GATT CP .3/SR22 – II/28 (Aug. 11, 1952). 
 43.  See generally BENN STEIL, THE MARSHALL PLAN: DAWN OF THE COLD WAR (2018) 
(providing a comprehensive discussion of the history, implementation, and ramifications of 
the Marshall Plan).  
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Western Europe but restricted exports to Communist Eastern 
Europe.44  The Marshall Plan provided member states an early test 
case to evaluate the meaning of Article XXI.45   
Czechoslovakia faced pressure from the Soviet Union to decline 
assistance, so they challenged the Marshall Plan as a violation of the 
GATT.46  The United States justified its protectionism under Article 
XXI, arguing that it served both the U.S.’ and its Western allies’ 
national security interest.47  The British delegation believed the 
United States should be able to determine which issues affect its 
national interest, but should not have unfettered discretion in its 
usage of Article XXI because it could undermine the entire 
agreement.48  Ultimately, the GATT members dodged the substantive 
question by voting seventeen to one against the referral of the issue to 
arbitration.49  
The substantive avoidance of the issue initiated a pattern that 
would continue until today.50  Article XXI has only been invoked six 
times, and it has never been formally adjudicated by either the GATT 
or the WTO.51  Presently, the United States argues the lack of Article 
XXI jurisprudence highlights the WTO’s complete deference to 
member states on the specific subject of national security.52  
However, this argument fails to acknowledge the historical respect  
 
 
 44.  Id. at 709. 
 45.  PELC, supra note 30, at 101.  
 46.  MICHAEL BRECHER AND JOHNATHAN WILKENFELD, A STUDY OF CRISIS, 339-41 
(1997). 
 47.  Vice Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Speech by the Head of the 
Czechoslovak Delegation Under Item 14 on the Agenda, at 10, CP.3/38 (June 2, 1949). 
 48.  GATT Council, Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting, at 9, CP.3/SR.22 
(June 8, 1949). 
 49.  Id. The WTO’s modern arbitration procedures had not been established in 1949. If 
the GATT members had voted to hear the dispute, then it would have been referred to the 
“Working Party” or an early version of a Dispute Resolution Panel. PELC, supra note 30, at 
103. 
 50.  See PELC, supra note 30, at 101 (explaining how member states have raised Article 
XXI six times as a defense but never insisted upon its usage during arbitration). 
 51.  E.g., 1996 Helms-Burton Act, WTO Doc. WT/DS38/1, May 13 1996; Trade 
Measures Taken By The European Community Against The Socialist Federal Republic Of 
Yugoslavia Communication From the European Communities. GATT L/6948. Panel Report, 
United States – Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua, March 13 1984, GATT B.I.S.D. (31st 
supplement 1985); United Kingdom and Falklands (GATT Doc. L/5319/Rev. 1 (May 5 
1982); Sweden—Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear, Nov 17, 1975, GATT/L/4250 at 
1; COM.IND/6/Add.4, p.53 (notification) (United States invoked Article XXI as justification 
of its embargo against Cuba in 1962); Ghana v. Portugal, SR.19/12 at 196 (1961).  
 52.   PELC, supra note 30, at 101. 
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paid to Article XXI’s unstated limitations.  In addition, this argument 
fails to account for how the text and history of Article XXI 
intertwines with the overarching object and purpose of the WTO.  
B. Legal Context 
The WTO’s Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU) specifies the rules for interpreting the 
WTO agreement.  The DSU’s interpretation occurs “in accordance 
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.”53 
1. Customary International Law Governing WTO Treaty 
Interpretation 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”) 
provides the rules for treaty interpretation in public international 
law.54  Even non-signatories to the treaty, like the United States, 
recognize the binding nature of the VCLT as customary international 
law.55  The WTO’s dispute settlement process, like any other 
international tribunal, must adhere these rules when interpreting its 
statute in a dispute between member parties.56  Both the dispute 
settlement panels and the AB use these rules to ensure the rights and 
obligations of the WTO Agreement are not enlarged or diminished by 
member states.57 
The VCLT’s general rule of treaty interpretation calls for 
treaties to be “interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in light of its object and purpose.”58  The VCLT 






 53.  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 
3.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. 
 54.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 311, art. 1 
[hereinafter VCLT]. 
 55.  U.S. Department of State, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, https://www.s 
tate.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2019). 
 56.  DSU, supra note 53, art. 3.2. 
 57.  Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products, ¶ 46, WTO Doc. WT/DS50/AB/R (adopted Dec. 19, 1997). 
 58.  VCLT, supra note 54, art. 31. 
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annexes, and supplementary instruments or agreements.59  Finally, 
subsequent agreement or practice between the states can be used to 
further elucidate treaty terms.60 
2. Appellate Body’s Decisions Bind Member States 
WTO member states acceded to the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) in as part of the Marrakesh Agreement creating 
the modern WTO.61  Article 1.1 of the DSU requires member parties 
to abide by the rules and procedures governing disputes.62  The DSU 
authorized the creation of the Appellate Body and its jurisdiction to 
issue binding decisions over trade disputes related to the WTO 
Agreement’s provisions.  According to Article 3.2 of the DSU, 
“Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and 
obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify 
the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law.”63  The 
Appellate Body, therefore, retains the authority to interpret Article 
XXI’s terms and their impact on the rights and obligations of 
Member states. 
While the United States may challenge the meaning of Article 
XXI and its application to the current tariff dispute, it may not 
question the AB’s authority to decide a dispute over WTO 
Agreement terms between two or more WTO members.  The 
international legal maxim, pacta sunt servanda, or agreements must 
be kept, constitutes the bedrock of international treaty law.64  The 
United States acceded to the WTO and the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding and cannot unilaterally impose its interpretation the 
Agreement’s terms in a dispute.  The U.S.’ non-compliance with the 
AB’s decision not only violates the express terms of the DSU, but its 
object and purpose to preserve “the effective functioning of the WTO 
and the maintenance of a proper balance between the rights and 




 59.  Id.  
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
 62.  DSU, supra note 53, art 1.1. 
 63.  DSU, supra note 53, art. 3.2. 
 64.  VCLT, supra note 54, art 26. 
 65.  DSU, supra note 53, art 3.3. 
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analytical roadmap to structure their interpretation of Article XXI in 
both the current steel dispute and subsequent invocations of national 
security. 
III. ANALYSIS  
Treaty analysis starts with its express terms, but Article XXI’s 
ambiguous language limits the AB’s ability to definitively determine 
its scope.  While the preceding historical overview of Article XXI 
suggests a bounded reading of the text,66 VCLT rules mandate an 
examination of the treaty’s object and purpose to fully grasp the 
meaning of a treaty’s terms in a given dispute. This section offers the 
AB an analytical roadmap for Article XXI.  It first analyzes Article 
XXI in light of the WTO’s object and purpose and provides further 
analytical backing by analogizing the current dispute to the 
influential WTO dispute, Shrimp-Turtle.  
A. Object and Purpose Analysis: U.S. Steel Tariffs Exceed 
Article XXI’s Scope Based on the WTO’s Margin of 
Appreciation  
The general rule of treaty interpretation is to read a contested 
clause “in light of its object and purpose.”67  A treaty’s object and 
purpose can usually be found in its preamble,68 but in this case the 
WTO’s preamble cannot elucidate the full scope of Article XXI’s 
application on its own.  The preamble calls for greater cooperation in 
the reduction of tariffs, but never addresses the U.S.’ specific 
assertion that Article XXI is self-judging within the narrow category 
of national security.69  The international law concept of margin of 
appreciation provides the necessary analytical leverage to connect 
Article XXI with the WTO’s object and purpose.  
Margin of appreciation provides states some latitude in 
complying with treaty obligations but only within the reasonable 
limits of the treaty’s object and purpose.70  The WTO’s preamble 
expresses its overarching object and purpose as “mutually 
 
 66.  Supra Part I(A).  
 67.  VCLT, supra note 54, art. 31. 
 68.  Id.  
 69.  WTO Agreement, supra note 4, pmbl. 
 70.  Saida El Boudouhi, A Comparative Approach of the National Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine Before the ECtHR, investment tribunals and WTO Dispute Settlement 
Bodies (European University Institute Working Paper 2015/27, 2015),  http://cadmus.eui.eu/ 
bitstream/handle/1814/35660/RSCAS2015_27.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2018).  
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advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of 
tariffs . . . to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in 
international commerce.”71  Therefore, Article XXI’s margin of 
appreciation allows the United States to enact measures to protect its 
national security, so long as it does not violate the WTO’s object and 
purpose to reduce tariffs and discriminatory treatment.  The WTO’s 
consistent usage of margin of appreciation in its jurisprudence 
necessitates its inclusion in Article XXI analysis.  
1. The Concept of Margin of Appreciation in the WTO 
The WTO system hinges on shared authority between its 
institutional rules and its member’s sovereignty.72  WTO adjudicative 
decisions inevitably intrudes on domestic law, so the WTO affords 
limited deference to its members when complying with some of its 
rules.73  The bounded discretion ensures members have some room to 
reasonably comply with its decisions without providing so much 
autonomy that members could circumvent their obligations.  
Bounded discretion in applying multilateral rules is not unique 
to the WTO.74  The European Court of Human Rights first formulated 
the concept in its “margin of appreciation” doctrine to provide states 
limited and reasonable discretion when deviating from international 
obligations based on individual societal or national interests.75  
Margin of appreciation doctrine initially arose in response to 
international policies that threatened a state’s national security.76  The 
earliest uses of the doctrine justified derogations from treaty 




 71.  WTO Agreement, supra note 4, pmbl. 
 72.  Tomer Broude, Selective Subsidiary and Dialectic Deference in the World Trade 
Organization, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 55 (2016). 
 73.  The paradigmatic example of the interplay between WTO and member state 
governance comes from Article XX. See infra Part III; see also Broude, supra note 72, at 56 
(explaining WTO’s multilevel governance structure). 
 74.  Oil Platforms (Iran v. US) [2003] ICJ Rep 90; Avena (Mexico v. US) [2004] ICJ 
Rep 77; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Opinion of 9 July 2004 [2004] ICJ Rep 136. 
 75.  Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843, 843 (1999). 
 76.  See Lawless, v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 195 (holding that a state may 
justify derogations from its international obligations during an emergency but the court 
reserves the right to scrutinize the decision). 
 77.  Benvenisti, supra note 75, at 845. 
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While the WTO does not use the exact term margin of 
appreciation in its charter or agreements, the WTO adjudicative 
panels apply the concept in its decisions.78  For example, the AB of 
the WTO79 makes recommendations on how member states can adjust 
its domestic legislation to avoid penalty.80  The AB also provides 
member states accused of rule violation a “reasonable period of time” 
to become in compliance.81  These prudential considerations show the 
AB’s careful methodology in avoiding either overt or rigid sanctions 
on members for alleged WTO rule violations.  The AB uses margin 
of appreciation to recognize the reasonable constraints members may 
have in compliance with the rules and to suggest feasible ways for 
members to become compliant given domestic limitations.82  
Even though a variety of international courts invoke margin of 
appreciation differently, the concept largely consists of two 
elements.83  The WTO’s AB, recognized two elements in its 
jurisprudence.84  The first involves “judicial deference” or giving 
member courts some latitude in evaluating whether its government is 
in compliance with WTO rules.85  The second is “normative 
flexibility,” which provides a zone of legality in which states could 
reasonably reach differing legal conclusions based on conflicting 
approaches to international norms.86 
 
 78.  See Broude, supra note 72, at 71 (noting how Article 11 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding instructs panels to make objective assessments of the applicability and 
conformity of the decision). 
 79.  The Appellate Body is equivalent to an appeals court within the WTO. The AB is 
comprised of seven people nominated by WTO members. They can uphold, modify or 
reverse the findings of dispute panels. World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement: 
Appellate Body, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2018). 
 80. For example in Shrimp-Turtle, the AB recommended that the United States soften its 
ban imported shrimp caught using particular types of nets. See discussion infra Part III(A). 
 81.  See Boudouhi, supra note 70, at 6 (discussing how the WTO Appellate Body uses 
the margin of appreciation concept within their jurisprudence). 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Yuval Shany, Towards a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International 
Law? 16 EUR. J. INT’L. L., 907, 909 (2005).  
 84.  Annex 1A to the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15 
1994, 33 ILM (1994).  
 85.  See Ireland v. UK, 2 EHRR 25, at 91-92 (1978) (holding the United Kingdom’s 
courts determine whether the government has power to make detention orders under the 
Emergency Provisions Amendment Act). 
 86.  Sheffield v. UK, 27 EHRR 163, 179 (1998); see also Appellate Body, Japan – Taxes 
on Alcoholic Beverages II, 34, WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R (adopted Oct. 4, 1996) (“WTO 
rules are not so rigid or inflexible as not to leave room for reasoned judgements in 
confronting the endless and ever-changing ebb and flow of real facts in real cases in the real 
world.”). 
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Margin of appreciation also imposes two constraints that apply 
generally.  First, states must act in good faith when exercising its 
discretion in complying with the terms of a treaty.87  The drafters of 
Article XXI recognized the importance of good faith and called on 
member states to respect the integrity of the WTO agreement with 
good faith interpretations of Article XXI.88  Second, international 
courts possess the authority to review whether a national policy 
decision conforms with the object and purpose of the governing 
obligation.89  The WTO’s arbitration process also uses this same 
review power in its decisions.90  In sum, margin of appreciation gives 
states some flexibility in complying with WTO rules, but states must 
use this flexibility in good faith and its actions can be reviewed to see 
if it violates the WTO Agreement’s object and purpose.  
The United States argues that the margin of appreciation should 
not apply to Article XXI and member states should have sole 
discretion in determining the article’s limits.91  The preceding 
analysis refutes this argument by demonstrating how the WTO 
incorporates margin of appreciation into its decisions even when not 
expressly mentioned in the text of the agreement.92  The next section 
presents how the WTO should conduct a margin of appreciation 
analysis of Article XXI.  
2. The U.S.’ Reading of Article XXI Exceeds Its Margin of 
Appreciation in Light of the WTO’s Object and Purpose  
The AB functions as the WTO’s appellate court,93 and it 
incorporates margin of appreciation and object and purpose analysis 
from the VCLT94 when deciding whether a member has breached the 
 
 87.  VCLT, supra note 54, art. 26. 
 88.  Shany, supra note 83, at 607.  
 89.  Id. at 911. 
 90.  See US – Tax Treatment of ‘Foreign Sales Corp’,  5, WTO Doc. WT/DS108/ARB 
(adopted Aug. 30, 2002) (Asserting that margin of appreciation must be used to assess the 
gravity of a wrongful act); see also infra Part III(A). 
 91.  See Third Party Executive Summary of the United States of America, Russia—
Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, ⁋ 28, WTO Doc. DS512 (Feb. 27, 2018) (plain text 
and drafting history of Article XXI shows that the national security exception is self-
judging). 
 92.  But see id. (asserting the plain text of Article XXI is sufficient in establishing the 
fully self-judging nature of the article). 
 93.  See supra note 79. 
 94.  Repertory of Appellate Body Reports, I.3.1 General Rules of Treaty Convention – 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e 
/repertory_e/i3_e.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2018).  
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terms of the WTO Agreement.95  In particular, the AB “is required to 
have recourse to context and object and purpose to elucidate the 
relevant meaning of the word or term.  This logical progression 
provides a framework for proper interpretive analysis.”96  The WTO’s 
AB uses the five objectives within the WTO agreement’s preamble to 
structure its interpretive analysis:97 keep the peace, promote world 
economic development and welfare, work towards sustainable 
development and environmental protection, reduce poverty of the 
poorest part of the world, and manage economic crises that might 
erupt partly due to the circumstances of globalization and 
interdependence.98  The AB may use one or all of these purposes in 
its margin of appreciation analysis depending on the context of the 
contested article.99  
The WTO AB’s reliance on object and purpose to resolve 
disputes also has specific precedents in the context of protectionist 
claims against the United States.100  In United States – Line Pipe,101 
the AB held the United States violated the WTO’s Safeguard 
Agreement Article 5.1 by restricting imported Korean carbon pipes 
due to alleged safety concerns.102  Even though a small percentage of 
the imported pipes posed a safety risk, the U.S.’ import restriction 
exceeded the scope of the article in light of the WTO’s purpose to 
lower trade barriers between members.103  SA Article 5.1’s margin of 
 
 95.  VCLT, supra note 54, art. 31. The United States has not ratified the VCLT but 
considers most of its provisions customary international law. OLIVER DORR & KIRSTEN 
SCHMALENBACH, VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, 91 
(2018). 
 96.  Appellate Body, United States – Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing 
Methodology, ⁋ 268, WTO Doc. WT/DS350/AB/R (adopted June 2, 2009). 
 97.  JACKSON, supra note 16, at 81. 
 98.  WTO Agreement, supra note 4, pmbl. 
 99.  See Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body, 21 
EUR. J. INT’L. L. 605, 622 (2010) (describing how the purpose of a treaty’s provision 
influences the AB’s margin of appreciation analysis). 
 100.  The WTO’s dispute settlement procedure operates at multiple tiers. While it 
encourages negotiations and consultations between parties, states may submit a dispute to 
the Dispute Settlement Body which convenes a “panel” of experts to hear the case. Either 
side may appeal the panel’s ruling to the Appellate Body which can uphold, modify or 
reverse the panel’s conclusions. The Dispute Settlement Body, which consists of All WTO 
members, must accept or reject the Appellate Body’s decision, but rejection requires 
consensus from the members. Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 
2018). 
 101.  Appellate Body, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of 
Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WTO Doc. WT/DS202/AB/R, 
(adopted Feb. 15, 2002). 
 102.  Id. ⁋ 251. 
 103.  Id.  
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appreciation allowed importation safeguards, but only to the extent 
necessary to protect American consumers without infringing on 
international trade.104  The AB’s consistent reliance on both margin of 
appreciation and object and purposes provides sound justification for 
why Article XXI should be similarly analyzed under the same 
framework.  
The U.S.’ steel tariff violates Article XXI’s margin of 
appreciation in light of the WTO’s key object and purposes:105 it 
weakens international security and burdens economic development.  
First, the U.S. steel tariff contravenes the original purpose of the 
WTO to mitigate trade tensions that can erupt into armed conflict 
between international powers.106  The U.S. steel tariff has escalated 
tensions between the United States and triggered a “tit for tat” trade 
war with the largest economies in the world.107  Article XXI’s margin 
of appreciation includes member states protecting their own national 
security interests, but it would seem unreasonable in light of the 
WTO’s object and purpose, to use the exception to jeopardize the 
economic interests of other member states.108   
Second, the United States tariffs oppose the WTO’s objective to 
stimulate overall economic development.  The founding document of 
the WTO, The Marrakesh Agreement, asserted that higher living 
standards, full employment and sustainable development can be 
achieved through  “substantial reduction of tariffs and other obstacles 
to trade.”109  The United States steel tariffs may benefit the American 
steel industry, but it appears to damage other sectors of the United 
States and world economy.110  Article XXI’s margin of appreciation  
 
 
 104.  Id. ⁋ 258. 
 105.  The other three object and purposes mentioned in the preamble (i.e., work towards 
sustainable development and environmentalism, reduce poverty, and manage economic 
crises) are likely applicable as well; however, a full factual analysis behind the United States 
Steel Tariff and its global impact is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 106. Contribute to Peace and Stability, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto 
.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10thi_e/10thi09_e.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2018). 
 107.  Mary A. Marchant & H. Holly Wang, U.S.—China Trade Dispute and Potential 
Impacts on Agriculture, 33 CHOICES 1, 1 (2018). 
 108.  See Chad P. Brown, Steel Aluminum, Lumber, Solar: Trump’s Stealth Trade 
Protection, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 2 https://piie.com/syst 
em/files/documents/pb17-21.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) (“The administration’s stated 
protectionist measures are likely to damage the US economy and could spiral out of control, 
leading to retaliation”). 
 109.  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
 110.  Brown, supra note 108, at 14. 
DAVIS  
380 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 34:11 
might tolerate some negative externalities from a national security 
measure, but it seems unreasonable to impose measurable economic 
costs on twenty-seven member states plus the European Union.111  
Moreover, unlike the American export restrictions in the 
Czechoslovakia case112 that benefited Western Europe, the steel tariffs 
in the current dispute harm Western Europe.113  The Czechoslovakia 
case was never formally adjudicated, but the United States in 1949 
could have argued that their Marshall Plan was consistent with the 
GATT’s object and purpose because it aimed to bolster the 
economies of Western Europe after World War II.114  The United 
States cannot make the same argument in the present steel tariff 
dispute because they were expressly imposed to benefit the United 
States at the expense of other trading partners.115  Article XXI’s 
margin of appreciation might have permitted the Marshall Plan’s 
protectionist tactics because it furthered the GATT’s goal of 
economic development of member states,116 but it would seem 
unreasonable to further extend the margin of appreciation to include 
deliberate measures that harm other member states’ economies—
directly contravening the WTO’s goal to spur economic 
development. 
Article XXI’s margin of appreciation allows member states to 
reasonably declare and pursue their own national security interests.  
The margin of appreciation ends when a member states’ national 
security interest infringes on either the security or economic interests 
of other member states.  Therefore, the U.S.’ steel tariff exceeds the 
boundaries of Article XXI’s margin of appreciation. 
 
 
 111.  See supra note 7. 
 112.  See supra part I(B).  
 113.  See supra note 7. 
 114.  See supra text accompanying notes 40‒42. 
 115.  President Trump, Remarks by President Trump to the Seventy-Third Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly, Sep. 25, 2018, THE WHITE HOUSE,  https://www.white 
house.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-73rd-session-united-nations-
general-assembly-new-york-ny/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2018). 
 116.  The British delegate served as America’s strongest ally in the Czechoslovakia case, 
but even he expressed some doubts about the extent of Article XXI’s self-judging nature. See 
supra note 46. If the United States’ argument engendered doubts from its strongest ally in 
1949, then it seems even more unlikely their argument would prevail today. 
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B. Analogical Analysis: Shrimp-Turtle Shows Article XXI’s 
Application Should Be Limited Whenever It Might 
Endanger the Multilateral Trade System 
Article XXI’s national security exception is not unique within 
WTO rules.  Member states may derogate from the MFN principle in 
other narrow, technical circumstances.117  The most analogous 
exception article comes from Article XX or the “General Exception” 
provision.118  This article allows member states to deviate from tariff 
rules as necessary to protect human, animal, or environmental health, 
unless they are applied in an arbitrary, unjustified, or pretextual 
manner.119  Shrimp-Turtle constitutes the landmark case in the WTO’s 
Article XX jurisprudence.120  The case established the limits of how 
far member states may stretch a WTO exception article without 
compromising trade rules.121 
1. Shrimp-Turtle Explored the Boundaries of WTO’s Exception 
Articles 
The controversy that lead to Shrimp-Turtle started when the 
United States passed Section 609 of the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA).122  This law required imported shrimp to be caught using 
specialized nets that minimize harm to endangered sea turtles.123  
Malaysia, Thailand, India and Pakistan submitted a complaint to the 
WTO arguing the law violated the WTO’s MFN principle because it 
disadvantages “like products” (i.e., shrimp caught in regular nets) 
from member states.124  They asserted that if a state can unilaterally 
ignore a WTO obligation under Article XX under an environmental 
pretext, then there would be no limit to what a state could ban in the 
 
 117.  See WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. XXIV (providing exceptions for Regional 
Trade Agreements like NAFTA or the European Union); Id. art. XII (providing exceptions 
for Balance-of-Payments or measures to safeguard a state’s financial well-being); Id. art. IX 
(providing temporary relief to trade rules in exceptional circumstances). 
 118.  Id. art. XX. 
 119.  Id.  
 120.  Marc Rietvelt, Multilateral Failure: A Comprehensive Analysis of the 
Shrimp/Turtle Decision, 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 473, 474 (2004). 
 121.  See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, AFTER SEATTLE: FREE TRADE AND THE WTO, IN 
EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE 
MILLENNIUM 60-61 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001) (criticizing the AB for stretching 
Article XX at all). 
 122.  16 U.S. Code § 1537. 
 123.  Hiranya Fernando Senadhira, The Shrimp-Turtle Dispute: A Brief Legal Analysis, 1 
Bridges, no. 3 (1997) https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/the-shrimp-turtle-
dispute-a-brief-legal-analysis (last visited on 5 Apr. 2019). 
 124.  Id.  
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name of environmental protection.125  The United States argued that 
the ESA adhered to Article XX(b) and (g)126 of the WTO which 
exempts protectionist measures if they are “necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health… or [relates] to conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources.”127  
The AB agreed that Section 609 of the ESA furthered a 
legitimate environmental policy objective, and member states retain 
the authority and autonomy to pursue such policies under the 
WTO.128  Nonetheless, environmental protection measures must still 
comply with the requirements established in both the text of the 
article and of WTO in general.129  The AB held that the U.S.’ ban on 
imported shrimp constituted arbitrary discrimination and a disguised 
restriction on international trade under the “chapeau” (i.e., 
introductory clause) to Article XX.130  
The AB employed a two-step analysis to reach its conclusion.131 
First, they examined whether the purported policy objective fell 
within the specific exceptions of the Article.132  The United States 
satisfied the first step of the analysis because all parties in the dispute 
agreed that protecting endangered species is a laudable goal and 
should be covered under Article XX’s language.133  WTO member 
states should maintain the ability to protect the environment through 
individual and collective measures like Section 609 of the ESA.134 
The second step of the analysis examines whether a trade 
restriction violates Article XX’s chapeau, which requires states to 
respect multilateral trade rules even when using the general 
exceptions of Article XX.135  The chapeau functions as a prerequisite 
to the general exceptions listed in Article XX.136  The AB’s chapeau 
 
   125.    Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 14,  ¶ 198. 
 126.  WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. XX. 
 127.  Id.  
 128.  Panel Report, United States- Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, ¶ 7.1, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/R (adopted Jan. 29, 1996). 
 129.  Shrimp Turtle, supra note 14, ¶ 165. 
 130.  Id.  
 131.  See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 14, ¶ 118 (first identifying the policy in question and 
second analyzing whether it complies with the chapeau of Article XX).  
 132.  Id. ¶ 125. 
 133.  Id. ¶ 178 
 134.  Id. ¶ 142. 
 135.  Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A 
Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 739, 741 (2001). 
 136.  Id.  
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analysis corrected the initial Panel’s findings137 which had omitted 
specific reference to the WTO’s object and purpose.138  The AB 
interpreted the chapeau’s margin of appreciation in light of the object 
and purpose of the WTO in general.139  In sum, Article XX allows 
derogations from the WTO agreement, as long as they do not 
undermine the WTO’s multilateral trading system.140 
The U.S.’ argument floundered in step two of the analysis 
because it violated Article XX’s chapeau in light of the WTO’s 
object and purpose.141  The AB found its import ban on shrimp was 
“applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade.142  
The AB explained even if the U.S.’ individual measure did not 
constitute a threat to the system on its own, the type of measure used, 
if adopted by other WTO members could threaten the multilateral 
trading system.143  
2. The Parallels Between Shrimp-Turtle and U.S. Steel Tariffs 
The WTO’s AB has never analyzed how Article XXI should be 
applied in practice,144 however, the two-step analytical framework 
employed in Shrimp-Turtle provides a roadmap for how Article XXI 
should be evaluated.  The text in both articles provide broad 
exceptions to the WTO rules,145 and both Articles need to be 
construed in light of the WTO’s object and purpose.146  The two-step 
analysis behind Shrimp-Turtle suggests the United States may (1) 
retain the authority to decide and enact tariffs in furtherance of 
 
 137.  WTO disputes are first submitted to a panel of trade experts. Their decision is 
equivalent to a trial court in United States jurisprudence. Members may appeal a panel’s 
decision to the WTO’s Appellate Body. See supra note 84.  
 138.  MALGOSIA FITZMAURICE ET AL., TREATY INTERPRETATION AND THE VIENNA 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: THIRTY YEARS ON 170 (2010). 
 139.  Id. at 172. 
 140.  Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 14, ¶ 9. 
 141.  Id. at ¶ 156. 
 142.  See id. ¶ 184 (finding the environmental law applied in a manner that amounts to 
both “unjustifiable discrimination [and] arbitrary discrimination”). 
 143.  Id.  
 144.  See surpa note 49. 
 145.  Compare WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. XX(b) (“necessary for the protection 
of human, animal, or plant life or health”), with WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. XXI(b) 
(“necessary for the protection of its essential security interests). 
 146.  Compare Fitzmaurice, supra note 138, at 172 (noting Article XX’s chapeau must be 
interpreted according to the WTO’s object and purposes), with Part II(B) (arguing Article 
XXI’s margin of appreciation requires interpretation of the WTO’s object and purposes). 
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national security objectives, but (2) ultimately violate Article XXI of 
the WTO because the tariffs could threaten the trading system if 
adopted by other WTO members.147  
The United States likely passes the first step of the analysis 
because it rests on a legitimate, domestic policy objective. Similar to 
Section 609 of the ESA’s effort to protect wildlife in Shrimp-Turtle, 
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act—the law behind the U.S.’ 
steel tariffs—likely rests on valid legal reason to protect national 
security.148  Congress passed Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act 
in 1962 to empower the president to adjust trade policy in response to 
national security threats.149  None of the opponents to the U.S.’ tariffs, 
like the opponents in Shrimp Turtle, question the President’s 
underlying authority to institute tariffs.150  It is also unlikely the AB 
would criticize a member state for prioritizing national security 
interests in the same way it avoided criticizing a member state for 
pursuing environmental interests.151   
The United States likely retains the authority to judge for itself 
whether its national security interest meets the criteria of Article XXI 
in the same way as it retained the authority to decide whether its 
environmental protection interest meets the definition of Article 
XX.152  The language of Shrimp-Turtle carefully avoided any 
repudiation of the U.S.’ judgement in meeting the definition of 
Article XX because they the AB did not want to overstep its 
jurisdiction by commenting on the wisdom or quality of the law.153  
The AB also did not want to convey the message that member states 
lacked the authority to proactively enact domestic policies that served 
a legitimate policy objective.154  Therefore, the AB will likely find 
 
 147.  Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 14, ¶ 186. 
 148.  Brown, supra note 108. 
 149.  Rachel F. Fefer et al., Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for 
Congress, CRS REPORT, 1 (2018). 
 150.  The European Union’s request for consultations—a preliminary dispute resolution 
procedure within the WTO—questioned the United State’s as-applied interpretation of 
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act and not the act itself. See supra note 7. 
 151.  See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 14, ¶ 186 (“WTO Members are free to adopt their 
own policies aimed at protecting the environment as long as, in so doing, they fulfill their 
obligations and respect the rights of other Members under the WTO Agreement.”). 
 152.  US-Shrimp, Summary of Key Panel/AB Findings, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds58sum_e.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2018). 
 153.  See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 14, ¶ 185 (“We have not decided that sovereign 
nations that are Members of the WTO cannot adopt effective measures to protect endangered 
species, such as sea turtles. Clearly they can and should.”) (emphasis added).   
 154.  Id.  
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that the United States passes the first step of Article XXI analysis 
because the steel tariffs reflect a legitimate measure to further its 
national security interests.  
Nevertheless, the U.S.’ steel tariff fails step two of the analysis. 
Its steel tariff violates Article XXI because it would threaten the 
multilateral trading system if other members used the same type of 
national security justification to avoid its trade obligations.155  The 
AB stressed in Shrimp-Turtle that member states can only rely on the 
treaty’s exceptions if “they do not undermine the WTO multilateral 
trading system thus also abusing the exceptions contained in Article 
XX.”156  The AB worried that member states could start compiling an 
ever-growing list of valid environmental protections that could 
eventually eclipse the entire agreement.157  The U.S.’ argument that 
domestic steel protection furthers a national security interest could be 
similarly replicated and transferred to other industries by member 
states.158  This concern closely reflects the intent of the original 
drafters of Article XXI who worried the exception could swallow the 
entire agreement.159  While the national security is undoubtedly a 
serious concern for member states, the AB should be unwilling to 
uphold a unilateral protectionist measure that would undermine the 
international trading system.  
3. U.S.’ Counterargument Ignores How Their Tariffs Undermine 
the Multilateral Trading System 
The United States anticipated this comparison and attempted to 
distinguish Article XX and Article XXI based on a plain text analysis 
that provides members greater autonomy in deciding what constitutes 
a national security exception for themselves.160  The United States 
notes how Article XX lacks the crucial “which it considers” language 
contained in Article XXI.161  The United States contends that these 
three words unlock the gate to Article XXI’s protection.162  
Furthermore, unlike the chapeau in Article XX which requires 
members to consider the stability of the multilateral trading system, 
 
 155.  Id. ¶ 9. 
 156.  Id. ¶112. 
 157.  Jayati Srivastava and Rajeev Ahuja, Shrimp-Turtle Decision in WTO: Economic 
and Systemic Implication for Developing Countries, 37 ECON. & POL. WEEKLY 3445, 3452 
(2002).  
 158.  See supra note 75. 
 159.  See discussion supra Part I(A).   
 160.  See supra note 75. 
 161.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 162.  Id.  
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Article XXI omission of a chapeau relieves member states of their 
responsibility  to consider the impact of their protectionist measure 
on the multilateral trading system.163  
This argument misconstrues the essential holding of Shrimp-
Turtle which never questioned a state’s ability to declare and pursue 
policy objectives, but rather examined whether the practice would 
undermine the overall trading system in light of the WTO’s object 
and purpose.164  Shrimp-Turtle stands for the proposition that WTO 
exception language can be interpreted and adapted by states within 
reasonable margins of appreciation, but the integrity of the 
multilateral trading system serves as the ultimate limit to its 
application.165  Nothing in the WTO’s history,166 the text of Article 
XXI,167 or its jurisprudence168 would permit reading Article XXI 
separately from the objects and purposes of the agreement.  The 
United States may be able to declare and enact measures in 
furtherance of its national security interests, but that does not mean it 
can completely avoid the fundamental purpose of the WTO to lower 
trade barriers between its members. 
The United States sole reliance on the text of Article XXI is 
insufficient in light of the nuanced analysis from the AB in the 
Shrimp-Turtle case.  The AB’s decision reflects a delicate balance 
between political and environmental concerns on one side and the 
integrity of the WTO’s trading system on the other.169  The U.S.’ 
unadulterated use of Article XXI without any consideration for 
fellow WTO members constitutes an impermissible threat to the 
multilateral trading system.  It creates the type of protectionist 
measure that could be easily copied and applied against WTO 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Article XXI represents the last-ditch safety valve to WTO rules.  
Member states may place tariffs on other members, directly 
contradicting the object and purpose of the WTO agreement, but only 
in the extraordinary circumstances of national security emergency.  
Member states may even judge for themselves what counts as a 
national security emergency, but not beyond Article XXI’s margin of 
appreciation in light of the WTO’s object and purpose.  The U.S. 
steel tariffs violate the terms of Article XXI, not because the United 
States lacks the ability to decide for themselves what counts as a 
national security interest, but because their unrestrained use of Article 
XXI threatens the multilateral trading system.  The Shrimp-Turtle 
decision further illustrates how the U.S.’ sweeping steel tariffs 
unreasonably exceeded the boundaries of Article XXI’s national 
security exception.  
Therefore, the Appellate Body of the WTO must review and 
reject tariffs merely invoked in the name of national security to avoid 
creating a precedent in which member states may indiscriminately 
apply tariffs without consideration of the consequences to members.  
Carefully analyzing and striking down such tariffs according to 
Article XXI’s history, margin of appreciation, and comparison to 
similar precedents would send a powerful signal to all members 
within the WTO.  No member state, not even the principal architect 
of the multilateral trading system,170 can pretextually use national 
security to circumvent WTO rules.  
 
 170.  See supra note 15. 
